Reliability Lost, False Confessions Discovered by Godsey, Mark A.
Chapman Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 3 Article 5
2007
Reliability Lost, False Confessions Discovered
Mark A. Godsey
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions Discovered, 10 Chap. L. Rev. 623 (2007).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol10/iss3/5
623-630 GODSEY.DOC 9/18/2007 7:01:51 AM 
 
623 
Reliability Lost,  
False Confessions Discovered 
Mark A. Godsey* 
INTRODUCTION 
The advent of post-conviction DNA testing in the past twenty 
years has spawned an “Innocence Revolution,” in which hundreds 
of Americans imprisoned or on death row for serious crimes like 
murder and rape have been conclusively proven innocent and re-
leased.1  DNA testing gives our criminal justice system some-
thing like a crystal ball—it allows us to look back in time with 
absolute clarity to determine how and where things went wrong 
in ways we never could before. 
It was not uncommon in earlier decades to find judicial opin-
ions espousing the view that wrongful convictions simply do not 
occur in America.  Now, however, we know better.  From study-
ing the cases of wrongful convictions, we now know that eyewit-
ness identification is not nearly as reliable as once believed.2  We 
also know that hundreds of innocent people have been convicted 
through the use of “junk science,” such as bite mark analysis or 
microscopic hair comparison, which DNA testing has proven to be 
wildly inaccurate.3 
 
 Copyright © 2007 by Mark A. Godsey 
 * Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; Faculty Director, Lois 
and Richard Rosenthal Institute for Justice/Ohio Innocence Project.  Former Assistant 
United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, 1996–2001.  E-mail:  
markgodsey@gmail.com.  This essay is the written version of my talk at the Chapman 
Law Review symposium entitled Miranda at 40: Applications in a Post-Enron, Post-9/11 
World.  I would like to thank the Chapman University School of Law School and the 
Chapman Law Review for hosting this outstanding symposium, and all the symposium 
participants who helped provide feedback that shaped and improved this essay.  I would 
also like to thank UC law student Bobbi Madonna for her outstanding research assis-
tance. 
 1 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005). 
 2 Arnold Loewy, Systemic Changes That Could Reduce the Conviction of the Inno-
cent 4 (UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 927223, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=927223; Gross, supra note 1, at 542.  
See also Innocence Project—Eyewitness Misidentification, http://www.innocenceproject. 
org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php. 
 3 Loewy, supra note 2, at 7.  See also Innocence Project—Unreliable and Limited 
Science, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science.php. 
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Most importantly for my purposes here, we now know that 
suspects will confess all too often to crimes that they did not 
commit, leading to wrongful convictions.4  Of all the things that 
DNA has taught us about our criminal justice system, this phe-
nomenon is perhaps the hardest to accept.  The idea that a sus-
pect would falsely confess to a crime that he did not commit 
seems counterintuitive and nonsensical.  Psychiatrists and social 
scientists are examining the reasons why false confessions occur, 
and we have a long way to go before we will have a complete an-
swer.  At any rate, DNA testing has proven that false confessions 
by innocent people occur more often than most would have ever 
imagined. 
For centuries, constitutional confession law in the United 
States has been concerned with the reliability and accuracy of 
confessions.  Prior to admitting the confession into evidence, a 
court in this country had to examine whether the confession at 
issue was accurate and trustworthy.  In the 1986 case of Colo-
rado v. Connelly,5 however, the United States Supreme Court 
suddenly subverted reliability as a factor when considering the 
admissibility of a confession.  Then, ironically, shortly after Con-
nelly was decided, DNA testing started to reveal why we should 
be very concerned about the reliability of confessions after all.  
Indeed, within a decade of the Connelly decision, the false confes-
sion problem in this country had been laid bare. 
In this essay, I attempt to shed light on this legal irony.  Part 
I briefly traces the role of the reliability factor in constitutional 
confession law from its origins through today.  Part II briefly ex-
plores our recent discovery of the false confession problem 
through DNA exonerations.  In the Conclusion, I offer some 
thoughts on how this problem should be resolved. 
 I.  THE RELIABILITY FACTOR: A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION 
Interestingly, courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries were much more aware of and concerned with the problem of 
unreliable confessions than their modern counterparts.  Anyone 
today who is concerned about innocent people being convicted by 
the use of false confessions would be envious of the protective 
doctrines in place during confession law’s infancy.  Indeed, prior 
to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the common law in Eng-
land was fast developing a rule of evidence that was highly sus-
picious of confessions.  The rule made it quite easy for a defen-
 
 4 Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal 
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 484–85. 
 5 479 U.S. 157 (1986).   
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dant to have his confession thrown out if the interrogator made 
any sort of promise or threat of the type quite common in modern 
interrogations.6  The reason for this delicacy was the fear of false 
confessions—that any sort of inducement might cause an inno-
cent person to utter an untruth.7  As the seminal 1783 case of 
The King v. Warickshall8 noted: 
 Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, 
under a consideration whether they are or are not intitled [sic] to 
credit.  A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest 
credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, 
. . . but a confession forced from mind by the flattery of hope, or by the 
torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape . . . that no credit 
ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.9 
In Warickshall and the American cases that followed its lead 
in the nineteenth century, even slight pressures—such as those 
which would be considered the norm in modern interrogation 
rooms—were deemed impermissible.10  Many of these cases in-
volved hints of leniency by the interrogators.  In the 1845 Ameri-
can case of State v. Bostick,11 for example, a promise by the inter-
rogator—that the suspect would receive leniency and would be 
“sent home” if she confessed—rendered the resulting confession 
inadmissible.  The court stated: 
[W]here promises of favor or threats are used, the great danger is, 
that the confession, whether verbal or written, may be untrue; pro-
ceeding, not from a sense of guilt, but from the influence of hope or 
fear.  In such cases, the confession is rejected.  Therefore, a confession 
obtained by temporal inducement, by threat, or by a promise of hope 
or favor, having some reference to the party’s escape from the charge, 
held out by a person in authority, is inadmissible.12 
In 1897, the Court in Bram v. United States13 incorporated 
this common law rule of evidence, presently called the “volun-
tariness rule,” into constitutional confession law by making it the 
test for admissibility under the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause.14  Bram further illustrates the highly sus-
picious attitude of courts toward confessions during this era.  In 
Bram, the defendant confessed after the interrogator made a 
 
 6 Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable 
Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 481–85 (2005). 
 7 Id. 
 8 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783). 
 9 Id. at 234–35. 
 10 Godsey, supra note 6, at 482–88. 
 11 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 563 (1845). 
 12 Id. at 565. 
 13 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
 14 Godsey, supra note 6, at 474–88. 
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mild and subtle suggestion of leniency.15  The Court focused on 
the following statement by the interrogating detective: “If you 
had an accomplice, you should say so, and not have the blame of 
this horrible crime on your own shoulders.”16  The Court ex-
plained: 
[H]ow could the weight of the whole crime be removed from the shoul-
ders of the prisoner as a consequence of his speaking, unless benefit as 
to the crime and its punishment was to arise from his speaking? . . . 
Thus viewed, the weight to be removed by speaking naturally im-
ported a suggestion of some benefit as to the crime and its punish-
ment arising from making a statement. 
 [The detective], in substance, therefore, called upon the prisoner to 
disclose his accomplice, and might well have been understood as hold-
ing out an encouragement that by so doing he might at least obtain a 
mitigation of the punishment for the crime which otherwise would as-
suredly follow.17 
Acknowledging that the inducement offered by the detective 
was slight, the Court noted, “the law cannot measure the force of 
the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the 
prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of 
influence has been exerted.”18 
Flashing forward to the mid-twentieth century, one finds re-
liability as an important, though not quite integral, factor in de-
termining the admissibility of confessions.19  The fifty-year period 
that is marked by Brown v. Mississippi20 in 1936 at the front end, 
and Colorado v. Connelly21 in 1986 at the back end, saw the reli-
ability factor thrive at times before its final demise in Connelly. 
Indeed, in the 1936 Brown decision, the reliability factor that 
originated in the common law voluntariness cases was still going 
strong.  In throwing out the confessions of several African-
American defendants who had confessed after being tortured by a 
sheriff and local mob in Mississippi, the Court focused on the un-
reliability of confessions obtained in such a manner.22  The court 
held that convicting the defendants solely on such unreliable evi-
dence violated due process as it amounted to a “mere pretense of 
a trial.”23 
In the middle part of the twentieth century, reliability re-
 
 15 Bram, 168 U.S. at 562. 
 16 Id. at 539. 
 17 Id. at 564–65. 
 18 Id. at 543. 
 19 Godsey, supra note 6, at 488–99. 
 20 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
 21 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 22 Brown, 297 U.S. at 281–82, 286. 
 23 Id. at 286. 
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mained an important factor in confession admissibility, but it 
was no longer the sole driving force.  The reliability of a confes-
sion was merely one of many factors that a court considered 
when deciding whether to admit or reject a confession under the 
governing due process voluntariness test.24  Nevertheless, during 
this era, courts could exclude a confession under due process 
based solely on the ground that it was unreliable.25 
In 1986, however, the Court handed down its decision in 
Colorado v. Connelly.26  In that case, a mentally ill man had 
walked up to a police officer in Denver and confessed to a mur-
der.27  A state-employed psychiatrist testified that the defendant 
had confessed while suffering from psychotic delusions in which 
God told him to confess or commit suicide.  (The state apparently 
did not contest the issue of mental illness).  Made under such cir-
cumstances, the confession was quite unreliable.  Indeed, the po-
lice were unable to corroborate that there had been an unsolved 
murder during the month and year in which the defendant 
claimed he had committed his crime. 
Despite such concerns about the confession’s reliability, the 
Court found no constitutional barriers to its admission into evi-
dence.28  Turning 200 years of confession law on its head, the 
Court stated: “A statement rendered by one in the condition of 
respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a 
matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, and 
not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”29 
With this language, the Court greatly undermined the role of 
reliability in the equation of confession admissibility.  It may be 
possible to limit this case on the grounds that, because the officer 
in question did nothing to induce Connelly’s confession, there 
was no state action.  Nevertheless, Connelly made clear for the 
first time that unreliability is not a stand-alone basis on which a 
court can exclude a confession on constitutional grounds.30 
 
 24 See Leo, supra note 4, at 493–96; Godsey, supra note 6, at 488–91. 
 25 See Leo, supra note 4, at 493–94.  But see id. at 495–96 (“The due process volun-
tariness test continued to evolve in the 1950s and 1960s as the Supreme Court began to 
recognize that an entirely false or unreliable confession could, logically, be considered vol-
untary and thus admissible into evidence against a criminal defendant.”). 
 26 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 27 Id. at 160–61. 
 28 Id. at 167. 
 29 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 30 Leo, supra note 4, at 499 (“With Connelly, the Court abandoned the reliability ra-
tionale upon which that doctrine originally had been premised.”).  In holding that there 
was no “state action” in the case, because the officer did nothing to induce Connelly’s con-
fession, the Court ignored the admission into evidence of the confession as a possible basis 
for state action.  Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165–67.  The admission into evidence of a false con-
fession had been the predicate “state action” in Brown v. Mississippi.  See 297 U.S. at 
286–87. 
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In sum, the period from Warickshall in 1783 through Bram 
in 1897 reflects the high-water mark in the criminal justice sys-
tem’s concern for false confessions.  Through the middle part of 
the twentieth century, reliability remained a chief concern.  In 
1985, the Court subverted this long-standing policy, holding that 
a confession’s unreliability could not be the sole reason for ex-
cluding a confession under the Constitution. 
II. THE RECENT DISCOVERY OF THE FALSE CONFESSION PROBLEM 
After Connelly was decided in 1986, Barry Scheck and his 
network of Innocence Projects across the country began using 
DNA testing to exonerate scores of inmates convicted of serious 
crimes.31  To date, more than 300 individuals have been exoner-
ated in this Innocence Revolution.32  Because DNA was either not 
left at the scene by the perpetrator, not collected by the police, or 
not properly preserved by the authorities in the vast majority of 
cases, the number of exonerations to date represents a small 
fraction of the number of innocent people wrongfully convicted. 
The DNA exonerations to date have revealed something par-
ticularly remarkable for those who study confessions.  In 25% of 
the cases of wrongful conviction, the innocent person falsely con-
fessed.33  Before DNA, there were few avenues to verify a false 
confession.  Simply put, the inmate would claim that he had con-
fessed falsely, but most people, including in many cases his law-
yer, would not believe him.  Now, scores of case studies involving 
actual false confessions exist, and they raise troubling questions. 
The problem of false confessions has become so pervasive 
that it frequently appears in the mainstream media.  It has been 
covered by nearly every television show dealing with criminal 
justice.  O, The Oprah Magazine (of all sources), recently ex-
plored this phenomenon in a glossy full-color feature.34 
While perhaps the most famous case of false confessions is 
the Central Park jogger case,35 pop fiction writer John Grisham’s 
recent work and first piece of non-fiction, The Innocent Man, may 
do the most to bring public awareness to this phenomenon.  In a 
riveting fifteen-page section in the middle of the book, Grisham 
puts the reader in the shoes of the suspect during a five-hour in-
 
 31 See generally BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: 
FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000). 
 32 Gross, supra note 1, at 524. 
 33 Leo, supra note 4, at 484. 
 34 Melba Newsome, True Crimes, False Confessions, O, THE OPRAH MAG., Apr. 2006, 
at 235. 
 35 For a detailed discussion of the Central Park Jogger Case, see generally Leo, su-
pra note 4. 
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terrogation.36  He describes the pressures, emotions and thoughts 
that lead to a false confession.  In the end, the suspect, Tommy 
Ward, who was later sent to death row on the basis of his false 
confession, decides to “play along” with the police and confess for 
two reasons: First, he is exhausted and worn down by the relent-
less questioning and pressure of the tag-team interrogation.37  
Second, he has an undying belief in the criminal justice system.38  
He believes that no innocent person could be convicted in this 
country.  He naively believes that if he tells a story, the question-
ing will end and the truth will quickly be discovered.39  Ward ra-
tionalizes: “Tomorrow, or the next day, the cops would realize 
that the story did not check out.  They would talk to Karl, and he 
would tell the truth.  They would find Odell Titsworth, and he 
would laugh at them.  Play along.  Good police work will find the 
truth.”40  The perceived low risk that the false confession would 
stand the test of time, coupled with the overwhelming desire to 
say anything to end the barrage of intense questioning and pres-
sure, gave way and resulted in a false confession.  While I cannot 
do justice to Grisham’s work in this short essay, anyone who 
struggles to understand how a rational and sane person could 
falsely confess to a murder should read the true story of The In-
nocent Man. 
It may take years for social scientists and psychiatrists to 
fully understand why and how often false confessions occur.  In 
the meantime, University of San Francisco Law Professor Rich-
ard Leo and others have produced a rich series of scholarly arti-
cles examining the root causes of this problem.41  For now, how-
ever, we know that false confessions are a problem, we know that 
many innocent people have been convicted as a result of false 
confessions, and we know that, because of Colorado v. Connelly, 
courts have no constitutional grounds on which to deal with this 
problem. 
CONCLUSION 
Many have offered ways to deal with the problem of false 
confessions.  Videotaping interrogations is an obvious improve-
ment, as it allows a judge and jury to accurately see what went 
 
 36 JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND JUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN 85–
100 (2006). 
 37 Id. at 91, 93. 
 38 Id. at 93. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 For citations to the empirical studies on false confessions, see Leo, supra note 4, at 
512–20. 
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on in the interrogation room.42  Several of the documented false 
confessions were videotaped, and watching a replay of the inter-
rogation allows one to see why the suspect falsely confessed in a 
way that could never be understood without such documentation.  
Richard Leo and others have suggested a corroboration rule and 
new reliability test based on a multitude of factors.43 
I endorse all of these approaches.  My point in this essay, 
however, is less ambitious than attempting to solve the problem.  
I seek merely to bring to light a sad irony in the development of 
our confession law.  The Supreme Court killed off the “reliability 
policy” as a factor in constitutional confession law in 1986, and 
then, suddenly, the problem of unreliable confessions surfaced 
with a vengeance.  Today we have empirical proof that false con-
fessions occur more often than we have ever imagined, yet our 
courts are substantially less concerned with the problem than 
they were 200 years ago. 
I have previously written that the Self-Incrimination Clause 
should not be concerned with reliability; I stand by that state-
ment today.44  The Court in Connelly erred, however, when it 
held that the Due Process Clause is not concerned with the ad-
mission of unreliable confessions.  The Connelly Court offered no 
legal basis for this holding, and ignored or distorted history to 
reach its conclusion.  Indeed, confession law and the Due Process 
Clause have been steeped in concerns about reliability for more 
than 200 years, and rightfully so.  No case is better than Brown 
v. Mississippi for illustrating how due process is offended by the 
introduction of a false or perjured confession that results in a 
“pretense of a trial.” 
As we move forward into the next century of confession law, 
it is my hope that we learn from our recent discovery of the false 
confession problem, recognize our mistake in Connelly, and heed 
the lessons of courts from a bygone era. 
 
 42 See Leo, supra note 4, at 530.  See also generally Christopher Slobogin, Toward 
Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309 (2003) (discussing the need for taping police interroga-
tions and outlining three constitutional grounds which would mandate taping as a routine 
practice). 
 43 Leo, supra note 4, at 520–39. 
 44 Godsey, supra note 6, at 474–99. 
